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Our major study of the cyclical behavior of interest rates is being con-
ducted by Phillip Cagan, though important contributions have been
made also by Reuben A. Kessel in connection with his study of the
cyclical behavior of the term structure. Kessel's findings will be re-
viewed at the end of this section. The purposes of Cagan's study are
(1) to discover what have been the cyclical movements in a wide variety
of interest rates over a long period of time; (2) to compare these move-
ments with cyclical fluctuations of general business and other variables
that might cast light on the causes of interest rate movements; (3) to
relate these findings to our other studies in ways that might help our
understanding of the determinants of interest rates generally.
Description of Cyclical Movements
In order to avoid generalizations about cycles that rest only on highly
special conditions, most of the following analysis omits reference to
two periods: World War I and from 1930 to the unpegging of long-
term rates in 1951.
Two major characteristics of cyclical fluctuations require special
attention. One is timing and the other is amplitude and/or rate of
change. With respect to either, there is a wide variety of behavior as
we compare different cycles with one another, and as we compare dif-
ferent interest rate series with one another. Despite this diversity, cer-
tain generalizations can be made. We shall begin with timing.
TIMING
Long-Term Securities. It is well known that the cyclical variation of
long-term interest rates have tended to lag behind the business cycle.
Our study confirms that belief, but it also indicates that the lag has
declined with the passage of time to the point where its continued
existence is in doubt. Indeed, at the 1960 cyclical peak, all but one ofCyclical Movements 57
the long-terms in our major study led the business cycle by four
months, and that one (corporate Baa's) was synchronous. The four
leaders were U.S. government bonds, Moody's corporate Aaa's, Stand-
ard 8c Poor's municipals, and Standard & Poor's railroad bonds.
Of these series the last two are available from the start of this cen-
tury. With respect to peaks, the data on these two series suggest that
there was a fairly continuous trend from a very substantial lag in the
pre-Worid War I period (about eight months) to no systematic lag
at all during the1950's. Their behavior at troughs is somewhat
different. It is generally characteristic of almost all rates, both short
and long, that there is a stronger tendency to lag at troughs than at
peaks. The two series now reviewed (Standard & Poor's municipals,
and Standard & Poor's rails) showed lags between 1900 and 1913 com-
parable to the large lags at peaks during the same period. But the
lags at troughs persisted, often exceeding a year, even after World
War I. By World War lithe size of lag was substantially reduced, and
even replaced by leads on two occasions. Thus the trend away from
long lags characterizes troughs as well as peaks, though for troughs
it started much later.
We may now generalize as follows with respect to the two long-term
series extending from 1900 to 1960. (1) At both trough and peak there
was a persistent tendency for closer and closer synchronization between
the cycle in business activity and the movements of interest rates. (2)
At troughs, although lags declined markedly, they continued to pre-
dominate over leads even through 1961. (3) At peaks the lag in these
long rates not only diminishes but in a slight majority of cases is re-
placed by leads after World War II. (4) There is not as yet sufficient
evidence to justify the view that there has been a genuine shift from
long-term lag to lead, but there is an important contrast between be-
havior at peaks and at troughs. Business still seems to turn up before
interest rates start to rise, but during the fifties rates turned down be-
fore business at least as often as after.
Other long-term series are not available over the full time period
since 1900, but their behavior in the period covered is consistent with
all the generalizations just made. Among the series in this group are
those available since 1920 for governments and corporate Aaa's and
Baa's. The only significant new result is that at peaks governments
moved from lag to lead sooner and more consistently than any of the58 Part II
other series. (There is one skipped turn and one synchronous turn, but
there are no lags after 1923.) At troughs the lag in governments con-
tinued much as in the other long-term series studied.
On two long-term series we have usable data beginning in 1882, but
these do not continue to the present. (Special features of the post-Civil
War period make it undesirable to begin cyclical analysis before 1882.)
These series are Macaulay's for railroad bonds and New England
municipals. At peaks these series showed substantial lags in each case
throughout the entire period from 1882 to 1913 (the median lags were
nine months for each series). At troughs we find much longer median
lags at the end of the nineteenth century (medians of fourteen months
for rails and twenty for the New England municipals) and the lags
are still appreciable during the first twelve years of the twentieth cen-
tury (seven and five months respectively).
In summary, the general conclusions presented above for the first
two series described hold for other long-term series. We can add,
however, that with respect to peaks the lags were long not only in the
early twentieth century but also in the late nineteenth. At troughs the
lags were even longer in the earlier period.
Short-Term Securities. The short-term securities examined here in-
clude Treasury bills, call money, commercial paper, bankers' accept-
ances, and bank loans. Our analysis of call money and commercial
paper goes back to 1882; for the others our analysis begins in 1920.
The two longer series show median lags of three and seven months
during six peaks at the end of the nineteenth century, compared with
two and six months, respectively, during the four downturns between
1902 and 1913. After 1920 none of these series shows any pronounced
trend, but all except bank loans show mixtures of leads and lags with
medians not far from zero.
If one compares the different short-term series described here, he
will note an almost steady increase in the frequency of lags from the
first to the last named. Treasury bills, for example, led business cycle
peaks at all their turns after 1920. Call money led in four out of seven;
commercial paper was synchronous in three and led in one out of
eight; acceptances led or were synchronous in three out of eight; bank
loans led in only one, were synchronous in one, and lagged in six.
Turning to troughs, call money and commercial paper each showed
median lags of four months for the last five troughs at the end of the
nineteenth century. During the first twelve years of this century, callCyclical Movements 59
moneyshowed a median lead of one month, while commercial paper
showed a median lag of four months. In the severe contraction of 1921
all series lagged behind the trough by eleven months or more. After
that period Treasury bills led more often than they lagged, and all the
other short-term series showed an overwhelming dominance of lags,
without any clear trend.
The following generalizations are suggested for short-terms:(I)
Shorts, like longs, show a trend toward fluctuations more nearly syn-
chronous with the cycle, but this trend isless pronounced in shorts
partly because they were much more synchronous than longs in the
early years. (2) At troughs lags in shorts, as in longs, continue to pre-
dominate in almost all series. (3) Treasury bills almost always lead at
the peak. Even at troughs they lead more often than any other series.
(It may or may not be significant, but we recall that in the long-
term market also it was Treasury securities that led more often than
any other at the peak.) (4) Call money is the only short-term series other
than bills with a substantial number of leads in either troughs or
peaks. (5) In the 1960 peak all short-term securities led the business
cycle (as did all longs but one).
Clustering of Turning Points Among Interest Rate Series and with
the Reference Cycle. In a somewhat different analysis of these data,
Cagan shows that with one exception turning points of interest rate
series are very much closer to one another than to the business cycle.
The one exception is the relation of commercial paper to call money
before 1914. As might be expected from the earlier analysis, the tend-
ency for turning points of interest rates to cluster more about each
other than the business cycle is much more pronounced in troughs,
where the lag of interest rates behind the cycle is especially pro-
nounced.
AMPLITUDE OF CYCLICAL MOVEMENTS
Ever since the publication of Burns and Mitchell's Measuring Busi-
ness Cycles, the term "amplitude" has had two different meanings in
business cycle parlance. One is the conventional usage, where the am-
plitude refers to the difference between the trough and peak levels
reached by a series. A second, referred toa.s "amplitude per time
period," is of fundamentally different quality, referring not to the
total rise or fall between peaks and troughs but to the rate of change.
It is obvious that these need not be closely correlated. Change might60 Part II
be very gradual, giving a low "amplitude per month," but might con-
tinue for a long period before the turn, so that the conventional "am-
plitude" would be quite great. On the other hand, in comparisons
among series whose cyclical movements are of about the same dura-
tion, as is often the case with interest rates, the two types of measure
yield substantially the same relative differences. As the context in the
following section indicates, the term "amplitude per month," or rate
of change, is the one usually used.
The amplitude of cyclical movement on call money rates and com-
mercial paper rates was very wide between 1885 and 1913, averaging
between 11 and 31 basis points per month. This amplitude declined
during that period and it continued at generally much lower levels
after 1919, as may be seen in Table 6. In sharp contrast to this, the
amplitude of movement in long-terms was extraordinarily low in the
TABLE 6





1953-61 1919-29 1900-13 1885-1900
Short-term rates
Call money 7.3 19.5 27.9 31.1
Commercial paper 11.6 10.7 11.6 22.8
Bankers' acceptances 12.4 11.9
Bank loans 5.4 4.7
Treasury bills 14.5 11.3
Long-term rates
U.S. bonds 3.8 3.3
Corporate bonds (Aaa) 2..3 2.5
Corporate bonds (Baa) 3.7 4.4
Corporate and municipal
bonds 4.2 2.2 1.6
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early period, averaging between 1.5 and 2.1 basis points per month
between 1885 and 1913 on the two series available. Amplitudes on
longs were substantially higher after World War I than before. Thus
the secular change in amplitude was exactly the opposite on longs
from what it was on shorts, and it was very marked in both cases.
The preceding table and discussion relate to the amplitude of in-
terest rate movements without making any allowance for the nature of
concomitant business cycles. The important question is thus raised:
TABLE 7
Ratio of Interest Rate Amplitudes in Specific Cycles of 1950's
to Amplitudes in Matching Cycles of 1920's
Type of Loan Ratio
Expansion Contraction
Commercial paper 2.0 1.6
Treasury bills 2.1 1.3
Acceptances 1.8 1.1
Bank loans 2.2 0.8
Federal Reserve discounts 2.2 1.1
How have interest rate amplitudes changed relative to change in busi-
ness cycle amplitudes? Cagan's research makes it reasonably clear that
on short-term loans other than call money the amplitude of cyclical
movements has increased relative to that of business cycles since the
First World War. Two experiments led to this conclusion. In one,
Cagan matched cycles in the fifties with those in the twenties when
the business cycles were of similar amplitude. He then found the
ratio of the amplitude of the interest rate cycle in the fifties to that
of the matching cycle in the twenties. Any ratio greater than unity
implied an increase in interest rate amplitudes relative to business
cycle amplitudes. His results indicate an increase in amplitude on
shorts in every case except in bank loan rates during contractions.
Rates tested were those on commercial paper, Treasury bills,ac-
ceptances, bank loans, and Federal Reserve discounts. Table 7 pre-
sents the findings.62 Part II
Another attempt to answer the same question was made by regres-
sion analysis in which one independent variable was the average
monthly cyclical amplitude of the index of industrial production, and
the other a dummy variable the values of which depended on whether
the cycle referred to was in the twenties or in the fifties. The b-coeffi-
cients of the latter indicate whether interest rate amplitudes were
higher during the fifties than the twenties. In all short-term rates except
call money, these coefficients confirmed previous conclusions by in-
dicating that interest rate amplitudes rose relative to amplitudes of
industrial production between the 1920's and the 1950's. Indeed, even
bank loans, which contradicted the general finding according to the
first test, proved consistent with it in this test. The results are shown
in Table 8. In only two cases was the b-coefficient statistically signifi-
cant at the 5 per cent level, but the consistency of the results lends a
measure of confidence to the conclusion that the amplitude of short-
term rates has probably risen relative to cycles of industrial activity.
Turning to long-term rates, the evidence of an increase in ampli-
tudes relative to business cycle fluctuations since the 1920's is not very
clear. The regression procedure mentioned earlier indicated declines
in the relative amplitudes of both governments and Baa corporates
(Table 6).It showed a rise in corporate Aaa's, but this increase
amounted to only one basis point per month. The amplitudes of
municipals also increased. None of these coefficients was statistically
significant at the 5 per cent level, though municipals showed almost
that level of confidence.
This analysis has been concerned only with specific cycles in in-
terest rates. Between business cycle peaks and troughs, long- and short-
term rates have shown clearly higher amplitudes in recent years be-
cause of the more nearly synchronous timing of business and interest
rate cycles.
Comments on Causation
For many of us the most important reason to learn about the cyclical
behavior of interest rates is to help find the causes of this behavior. It
is impossible to observe the fluctuations just described without think-
ing of many questions and possible hypotheses that call for further
study. Systematic exploration of these questions is only beginning, butCyclical Movements 63
TABLE 8
Specific Cycle Amplitudes in Interest Rates Adjusted
for Severity of Corresponding Business Cycles,
Change from 1919 -29 to 1953-61
Estimated Amplitude, Change in Amplitude Per
in Basis Points Per Month, from 1919-29 to 1953-61,
Month, for 1 Per Cent Holding Business-
Change in Business—ActivityIndex Constant




Call money .04(±.13) —10,4(±14.6) —53.3
Commercial paper (±.05) 4•9S(± 4.9) +45.8
Treasury bills (±.05) (±5.2) +46.0
Acceptances .05(±.12) 2.7(±12.0) +22.7
Bank loans .03(±.04) 2.1(± 4.2) +44.7
Federal Reserve
discounts .03(±.09) 0.9(± 9.6) +10.8
U.S. bonds .00(±.03) —1.4(± 4.0) —42.5
Corporates(Aaa) .01(±.03) 1.0(± 2.9) +40.0
Corporates (Baa) .01(±.05) —1.9(± 6.1) —43.2
Corporates and
municipals .01(±.03) 1.9(± 33) +86.4
Municipals ..01(±.02) 2.0(± 2.1) +76.9
Note: Specific cycle amplitudes per month (in absolute value) were regressed
on amplitudes of business activity per month over matching reference expan-
sions and contractions and on a dummy variable (unity if phase was in the later
period, zero otherwise). Column 1 is the regression coefficient for amplitude of
business activity; column 2 is regression coefficient for the dummy variable;
column 3 is ratio of column 2 to average specific cycle amplitudes during the
period 1919-29. Business activity is measured by the Federal Reserve index of
industrial production.
S means significant at .05 level.
Parentheses contain range of error at the 5 per cent level of significance.64 Part II
Cagan has started two promising inquiries. One is concerned with
movements in the rate at which the money supply changes, and the
other with the behavior of banks with respect to loans and invest-
ments.
THE MONEY SUPPLY
As indicated by our theoretical comments in Chapter 1,interest
rates will be driven down, all else being equal, if the rate of increase
of the money supply is increased. Otherwise put, interest rates will fall
when (1) the money supply having been rising, its rate of growth in-
creases; or (2) the money supply having been falling, its rate of de-
cline either decreases or begins to increase. The description of such a
change can be greatly simplified if we recognize that a rate of decline
is simply a negative rate of increase, so that the first statement in-
cludes the other two. We shall use this terminology hereafter.
For each cycle from 1904—08 through 1958—61, Cagan has superim-
posed the reference cycle patterns for commercial paper rates on those
for the percentage change in the money supply. As Chart 11 shows, the
inverse conformity between these two series is striking, especially in
view of our recognition of the fact that many other elements must in-
fluence interest rates. Indeed this conformity is marked in every cycle
except the decline following 1929, when the rate of change in money
supply fell throughout almost all of the business decline, and interest
rates also fell. It is not difficult to imagine that demand forces in the
market for funds dominated in this case.
Characteristically, the rate of growth of the money supply has fallen
throughout or at least during the later part of a business expansion
and risen throughout or during the later stages of a business decline.
As already indicated, interest rates have generally done the opposite.
Furthermore, one should note the way in which the frequent lags in
the interest rate series have been accompanied by corresponding lags
in the money series (taken invertedly). In this form of presentation a
lead of interest rates at the peak appears only once, but on that occa-
sion (1960) the inverted money series also leads. It may also be noted
that in the 1960 peak the lead of interest rates occurred not only in
commercial paper rates, but in all interest rate series except one, both
short and long. This is the only time so near a unanimous lead has
occurred in Cagan's cycle patterns, and the 1960 peak is the only oneCHART 11
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during which an upturn in the money supply series came before the
business peak. In a number of cases, though not uniformly, lags of
the money series at the trough are also accompanied by lags in the
interest rate series. Taken together, evidence of this kind occurs often
enough to demonstrate that the close association between money be-
havior and interest rates is not merely a reflection of the business
cycle on each series, but is probably a genuine direct relationship.
This finding of a timing association between the monetary growth
rate and commercial paper rates led Cagan to more detailed study.
Changes between reference cycle stages in the montary growth rate and
interest rates series were correlated. This showed a strong inverse as-
sociation for all interest rates. To avoid spurious correlation between
common responses of the series to business cycles, a dummy variable
was used to hold the expansion phase and contraction phase constant.
The inverse association was still just as strong. This result is not the
same as the widely noted dependence of individuals' demand for a
stock of money on interest rates. The relation in Chart 11 is between
the rate of change in the money stock and interest rates.
Cagan then investigated several alternative explanations of these
correlations, to determine whether they reflected effect of money on
interest or the opposite direction of influence. Various tests suggested
that the correlations reflected primarily (though not necessarily exclu-
sively) monetary effects on interest rates. These results are important
and deserve to be followed up.
If we accept the suggested direction of influence, the question arises
whether monetary cycles help explain the changed cyclical behavior of
interest rates. Cagan concludes that much of the timing change in
interest rates, and half or more of the amplitude increase, can be at-
tributed to the effect of monetary cycles. What has happened is that
monetary cycles (on an inverted basis) have become more nearly
synchronous with business cycles though their amplitude of fluctua-
tion has, if anything, declined. The greater synchronization has meant
that the combined effect on interest rates of money and general busi-
ness cycle factors has increased. Money and these other factors no
longer offset each other as they once partially did.
We can only speculate about the reason for the remaining part of
the increased amplitude of rates that the regression results indicateCyclical Movements 67
cannot be explained in this way. Cagan conjectures that shifts over
the cycle in the precautionary demand to hold money have moderated
in recent years. Since these shifts work to dampen fluctuations in in-
terest rates produced by business cycles, a moderation of them would
increase the amplitude of cycles in interest rates.
BANK LOANS AND INVESTMENTS
Cagan has compared the cyclical patterns from 1919—21 through
1958—61 on short-term interest rates, long-ter:m interest rates, bank
investments, bank loans, and a number of other series. As is well
known, bank loans and bank investments commonly move inversely
to each other. The bank attempts to accommodate iI:s loan customers
and adjusts its investment portfolio as required to meet this need. If
necessary, and sometimes when not necessary, it. may borrow from the
Federal Reserve instead of selling securities, but this does not prevent
the opposite movements of loans and investments. The cyclical pat-
terns reveal this inverse conformity clearly, with loans moving cycli-
cally in agreement with business expansion and contraction. This
means that, typically, banks throw securities on the market during
the expansion of business. This cyclical pattern makes it plausible to
believe that one of the important factors causing interest rates on
bills and bonds to rise during business expansion may well be the
action of banks; that is, a changed demand for bank loans is trans-
mitted directly to the capital market through the securities in which
banks trade, primarily Treasury bills but significantly also inter-
mediate-term government notes and bonds. When the demand for
bank loans increases, bank sales of securities reduce their prices and
raise their yields. At the same time, bank rates on loans also increase
in response to expanding demand.
Important evidence in support of this thesis is revealed by study of
those cases where bank investments do not behave contracyclically. (It
is entirely possible for both loans and investments to rise and fall to-
gether, as, for example, when there are substantial changes in reserves
or reserve requirements.) Inverse conformity between interest rates
and bank investments remains strong and distinct in almost all these
cases, as well as when the bank investment behavior follows the busi-
ness cycle pattern.68 PartII
GENERAL COMMENT
We have indicated something of the means by which Cagan has used
cyclical analysis to devise and test hypotheses about determinants of
interest rate movements. The cyclical pattern.s show clear evidence of
causal factors operating on both the demand side and the supply side
of the capital market. In my view, a signal contribution of Cagan's
work is the fact that he has developed strong empirical evidence con-
firming the kind of relation between money a.nd interest rates that
economists have long assumed must exist but have failed to demon-
strate empirically. This is just the kind of relation described in the
section on theory at the start of this paper. Various past efforts to find
empirical support for this view have been thwarted by the fact that,
in studies of the relation between the supply of money and interest
rates, powerful demand influences have masked the supply side.
Cagan's use of the rate of change of money supply, instead of the sup-
ply as a stock, has clearly revealed the influence we have long pre-
sumed and wanted to demonstrate.
It is obvious that much more work needs to be done, not only to
test these influences more rigorously but also to explore some of the
many other hypotheses and questions that are thrust upon one by
study of the cyclical behavior of interest rates and related variables. In
the second phase of the interest rate project, Cagan will continue to
explore these questions. (See the final part of this paper.)
Kessel's Findings on Cyclical Behavior of Interest Rates
Independent of Cagan—indeed, preceding his work—Reuben Kessel
carried out some very useful analyses of the cyclical behavior of in-
terest rates. In some respects this study adds new information and in
others it provides a check of Cagan's findings. Kessel's study, unlike
Cagan's, concentrated on the behavior of governments and included
analyses of securities classified according to term to maturity. In this
respect it is significant that where Cagan's findings concern questions
about cyclical behavior similar to those explored by Kessel, their con-
clusions were entirely the same. Two major instances of common
findings may be cited briefly, and we shall then pass on to questions
where the studies do not overlap.Cyclical Movements 69
First, between 1885 and 1913, interest rate cycles were far from
being synchronous with business cycles, but the two moved closer
together after World War I and much closer yet after World War IL
During the thirties, however, interest rates were less synchronous with
business cycles than during the twenties. Second, as generally observed,
short-term rates on governments move much more widely over the cycle
than do longs. The striking difference is ind:icated in both Table 6
(Cagan) and Table 9 (Kessel). In addition to these conclusions, later
TABLE 9
Cyclical Changes in Yields of Government Securities,
October 1949- February 1961














Oct. 1949-July 1953—Aug. 19541.052.10 .88 1.05 —1.222.27
Aug. 1954—July 1957-Apr. 1958.883.591.162.71 —2.435.14
Apr. 1958-May 1960-Feb. 19611.163.53 2.37 —1.243.61
Average 2.04 —1.63
Nine- to Twelve-Month Governments
Oct.1949-July 1953-Aug. 19541.082.40 .62 1.32 —1.783.10
Aug. 1954-July 1957-Apr 1958.623.891.40 3.27 —2.495.76
Apr. 1958-May 1960-Feb. 19611.404.322.792.92 —1.534.45
Average 2.50 —1.93
Three- to Five-Year Governments
Oct. 1949-July 1953—Aug. 19541.362.741.68 1.38 —1.062.44
Aug. 1954-July 1957-Apr. 19581.683.952.41 2.27 —1.543.81
Apr. 1958-May 1960-Feb. 19612.414.633.522.22 —1.113.33
Average 1.96 —1.24
Twenty-Year Governments
Oct. 1949-July 1953-Aug. 19542.203.092.52 .89 —.571.46
Aug. 1954-July 1957-Apr. 19582.523.623.11 1.10 —.511.61
Apr. 1958-May 1960-Feb. 19613.114.243.77 1.13 —.471.60
Average 1.04 .5270 Part II
confirmed by Cagan, Kessel develops the following points:
1. At least since World War II, there has been a short-intermediate
range of governments which fluctuates more than either the shortest-
or the longest-term securities. One consequence of this has been that
in periods of high rates the yield curve has sometimes been humped in-
stead of continually rising or continually falling from left to right.1
The relatively large movement of the short-intermediates is revealed
in Table 9, as is the excess of short-term fluctuations over long-term.
It may be observed from column 6 that the cyclical amplitude of the
nine- to twelve-month governments exceeds that of Treasury bills not
only in averages for the period following 1949 but also in each in-
dividual cycle during the period.
2. On the average, short-term rates on governments have been lower
than longs ever since World War I, but the difference has been larger
at cyclical troughs than at peaks. Rates on three-month Treasuries ex-
ceeded rates on long-term governments only during two periods (June
1920 to March 1921, and January 1928 to November 1929). According
to Durand's basic yield data on corporate securities, short-term rates
frequently exceeded long-term rates before 1930 but on only one oc-
casion (1960) since then.
1Asexplained in an earlier footnote, the "yield curve" relates the yield of securi-
ties (plotted vertically) to their term to maturity (plotted horizontally). Thus a rising
yield curve depicts higher rates on longs than on shorts.